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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, information privacy has emerged as one
of the central issues of our times. Today, we have hundreds
of laws pertaining to privacy – the common law torts,
criminal law, evidentiary privileges, constitutional law, at
least twenty federal statutes, and numerous statutes in each of
the fifty states. To understand the law of information privacy
more completely, it is necessary to look to its origins and
growth. Technology has played a large role in the story of
the emergence of information privacy law. Frequently, new
laws emerge in response to changes in technology that have
increased the collection, dissemination, and use of personal
information.

II. COLONIAL AMERICA
To the colonists, America afforded unprecedented
privacy. As David Flaherty notes, “[s]olitude was readily
available in colonial America.”2 From the crowded towns
and cities of Europe, America’s endless expanse provided
significantly more space and distance from other people.3 But
many people still lived in small towns, where everybody
knew each other’s business. As Flaherty observes: “The
population in the early years was still so small that no person
could escape the physical surveillance of others without
special efforts.”4
Even in the early days of colonial America, there was
some limited legal protection of privacy. The law had long
protected against eavesdropping, which William Blackstone
defined as “listen[ing] under walls or windows, or the eaves
of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame
2

DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 1 (1972).
Id. at 33.
4
Id. at 2.
3
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slanderous and mischievous tales.”5 The common law also
sanctioned being a common scold, a law that applied only to
women.6
The law had long protected one’s home. The maxim that
the home is one’s castle appeared as early as 1499.7 More
well-known is a judicial pronouncement in Semayne’s Case8
in 1604 that “the house of every one is to him as his castle
and fortress.”9 According to William Blackstone, the law has
“so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s
house that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be
violated with impunity.”10
At the time of the Revolutionary War, the central privacy
issue was freedom from government intrusion. The Founders
detested the use of general warrants and writs of assistance.11
Writs of assistance authorized “sweeping searches and
seizures without any evidentiary basis”12 and general
warrants “resulted in ‘ransacking’ and seizure of the personal
papers of political dissenters, authors, and printers of
seditious libel.”13 As Patrick Henry declared: “They may,
unless the general government be restrained by a bill of
rights, or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and
5

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
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Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse
than the Disease, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1994); see also LEONARD W.
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999).
12
Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 82 (1998).
13
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979);
see also William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure,
105 Yale L.J. 393, 406 (1995).
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rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, everything you eat,
drink, and wear. They ought to be restrained within proper
bounds.”14
The Framers’ distaste for excessive government power to
invade the privacy of the People was forged into the Bill of
Rights in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The
Third Amendment protects the privacy of the home by
preventing the government from requiring soldiers to reside
in people’s houses: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner,
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.”15
The Fourth Amendment provides broad limitations on the
government’s power to search and to seize:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.16

The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from
conducting “unreasonable searches and seizures.”17
Government officials must obtain judicial approval before
conducting a search through a warrant supported by probable
cause.
The Fifth Amendment affords individuals a privilege
against being compelled to testify about incriminating
information.18 In other words, the government cannot
compel individuals to divulge inculpatory information about
themselves.
14

3 THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 448–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1974).
15
U.S. CONST. Amend. III.
16
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
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Id.
18
See U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
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III. THE 19TH CENTURY
A. NEW THREATS TO PRIVACY
The 19th century experienced a series of new threats to
privacy and a growing concern about protecting privacy.
1. The Census and Government Records
For much of the 19th century, state and federal
governments did not keep extensive information about
citizens.19 During the late 19th century, government recordkeeping at the state and local level began to increase with the
rise of progressive regulation.20
The primary form of information gathering by the federal
government was the census. The first census in 1790 asked
only four questions.21 The number of questions increased
with each census, growing to 142 questions in 1860.22 These
questions were increasingly delving into personal details. To
make matters worse, since 1790, copies of the census were
posted in public places so people could check errors.23 This
practice stopped in 1870.24
When the 1890 census asked about diseases, disabilities,
and finances, it created a public outcry, which ultimately lead
to the passage in the early 20th century of stricter laws
protecting the confidentiality of census data.25 For example,
19

ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 12 (2000).
20
Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1892, 1906-07 (1981).
21
See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY,
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 46 (1995).
22
See id.
23
See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 19
(1978).
24
See id.
25
See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY,
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 47 (1995).
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in 1919, Congress made it a felony to publicize census
information illegally.26
2. The Mail
Since colonial times, the privacy of the mail was a
significant problem. Sealing letters was difficult.27 Benjamin
Franklin, who was in charge of the colonial mails, required
his employees to swear an oath not to open mail.28 And in
1782, Congress passed a law that mail should not be
opened.29
Nevertheless, significant concerns persisted about postal
clerks reading people’s letters. Thomas Jefferson, Alexander
Hamilton, and George Washington frequently complained
about the lack of privacy in their letters, and they would
sometimes write in code.30 As Thomas Jefferson wrote:
“[T]he infidelities of the post office and the circumstances of
the times are against my writing fully and freely.”31
These problems persisted in the 19th century. As Ralph
Waldo Emerson declared, it was unlikely that “a bit of paper,
containing our most secret thoughts, and protected only by a
seal, should travel safety from one end of the world to the
other, without anyone whose hands it had passed through
having meddled with it.”32 The law responded to these
problems. Congress passed several laws protecting the
26

See id.
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 23-25 (2000).
28
Id. at 49; PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY,
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 46-49 (1995).
29
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 50 (2000).
30
Id. at 50-51; see also DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW
ENGLAND 115-27 (1972).
31
Thomas Jefferson in 1798, quoted in DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1978).
32
Quoted in ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY
AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 56-57 (2000).
27
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privacy of the mail.33 In 1825, Congress enacted a statute that
provided:
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any
post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or
from any letter or mail carrier, . . . before it has been delivered
to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct
the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of
another, or opens, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be
fined . . . or imprisoned.34

In 1877, in Ex Parte Jackson,35 the Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment prohibited government officials
from opening letters without a warrant: “The constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may
be.”36
3. Telegraph Communications
The burgeoning use of the telegraph raised a number of
privacy problems. Shortly after the telegraph’s invention in
1844,37 technology to tap into telegraph communications
emerged. As Priscilla Regan observes:
During the Civil War, the Union and Confederate armies
tapped each other's telegraph communications to ascertain
battle plans and troop movements. Rival press organizations
tapped each other's wire communications in order to be the
first to report major news items.38
33

Id., at 50-51.
42 U.S.C. § 1702. This law is still valid today. See ROBERT ELLIS
SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 51 (2000).
35
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
36
Id. at 733.
37
See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 123 (2000).
38
PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
34
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After the Civil War, Congress began to seek access to
telegraph messages maintained by Western Union for various
investigations.39 This raised a considerable outcry among
some members of Congress.40 Additionally, a New York
Times editorial decried the practice as “an outrage upon the
liberties of the citizen.”41 Another editorial in the New York
Tribune complained that the seizure of telegrams “violates
the commonest legal maxims as to the right to call for papers,
and outrages every man’s sense of his right to the secrets of
his own correspondence.”42 A New York Sun editorial stated
that “the idea that every curious and prying legislative
committee may cause to be spread before the public
everything that has been sent over the wires will be hateful
and repulsive to the people in general.”43
These problems resulted in a growing congressional
debate about whether telegrams should be accorded similar
privacy protections to letters.44 A bill to protect the privacy
of telegrams was introduced into Congress in 1880.45 The
bill would ultimately be abandoned.
But beyond
congressional attempts to obtain telegraph communications,
the law responded to restrict other entities from breaching the
privacy of telegrams. Several courts quashed subpoenas for
telegrams, analogizing them to letters.46 As the Missouri
Supreme Court stated in quashing a grand jury subpoena for
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 111 (1995).
39
See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 69 (2000); DAVID J.
SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1978).
40
See SEIPP, RIGHT TO PRIVACY, at 31.
41
Id. at 31.
42
Id. at 35.
43
Id. at 36.
44
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 69 (2000).
45
DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40
(1978).
46
Id. at 40.
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telegrams: “Such an inquisition, if tolerated, would destroy
the usefulness of this most important and valuable mode of
communication.”47 State legislatures also responded by
passing laws to prohibit the disclosure of telegraph messages
by telegraph company employees.48 More than half the states
enacted laws.49
B. THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS
Ex Parte Jackson was not the only major development in
Fourth Amendment law in the 19th century. In 1886, the
Court decided the landmark case of Boyd v. United States.50
The government wanted to compel a merchant to produce
documents in a civil forfeiture proceeding. The Court,
however, held that the documents could not be compelled,
basing its conclusion on both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right to personal security, personal
liberty and private property. . . . [A]ny forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime
or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that
judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendment run
almost into each other.

Boyd and subsequent cases created a powerful protection
of one’s papers and personal information. In the 20th
century, this protection increasingly interfered with the
growing administrative state. As William Stuntz notes,
“[g]overnment regulation required lots of information, and
Boyd came dangerously close to giving regulated actors a
47

Ex Parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (1880).
DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
(1978).
49
Id.
50
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
48
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blanket entitlement to nondisclosure. It is hard to see how
modern health, safety, environmental, or economic regulation
would be possible in such a regime.”51 As a result, the Court
began to retreat from Boyd throughout the 20th century.52
C. PRIVACY OF THE BODY
Another important Supreme Court privacy case of the
19th century established protection against physical bodily
intrusions. In 1891, the Court held in Union Pacific Railway
Company v. Botsford,53 that a court could not compel a
female plaintiff in a civil action to submit to a surgical
examination:
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a
compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel
any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to
submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is
an indignity, an assault, and a trespass . . . .54

This case is one of the earliest recognitions of what would
later come to be called “substantive due process privacy.”
The sanctity of the body was also recognized in the
common law, even prior to the birth of the privacy torts
following Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s article. In
De May v. Roberts,55 an 1881 case, a physician allowed a
“young unmarried man” not schooled in medicine to be
present while the plaintiff gave birth. The court reasoned:
It would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and
propriety to doubt even but that for such an act the law would
afford an ample remedy. To the plaintiff the occasion was a
most sacred one and no one had a right to intrude unless
51

William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1050 (1995).
52
See Part IV.B.5 infra.
53
141 U.S. 250 (1891).
54
Id. at 252.
55
9 N.W. 146 (1881).
9

invited or because of some real and pressing necessity.56

D. WARREN AND BRANDEIS’S THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The most profound development in privacy law was the
publication in 1890 of Warren and Brandeis’s article, The
Right to Privacy.57 According to Roscoe Pound, the article
did “nothing less than add a chapter to our law.”58 And Harry
Kalven, Jr. referred to it as the “most influential law review
article of all.”59
The article was inspired, in part, by a vastly expanding
form of media – the newspaper. In the second latter half of
the 19th century, newspapers were the most rapidly growing
type of media. Circulation of newspapers rose about 1000%
from 1850 and 1890, from 100 newspapers with 800,000
readers in 1850 to 900 papers with over 8 million readers by
1890. Increasingly, newspapers reported on sensationalistic
topics such as scandals and gossip about people’s lives, a
type of journalism that became known as “yellow
journalism.”60 As Warren and Brandeis observed: “The press
is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of
the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is
pursued with industry as well as effrontery.”61
Warren and Brandeis were also concerned about a new
technology: “instantaneous photograph[y.]”62 Cameras had
56

Id. at 148-49.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
58
ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946).
59
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 L. & Contemp. Probs. 326, 327 (1966).
60
William L. Prosser, Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 104, 104 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed.,
1984) (noting rising popular dismay over “yellow journalism” at the time
of Brandeis’ and Warren’s article).
61
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
62
Id. at 195.
57
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been large, expensive, and not very portable. In 1884, the
Eastman Kodak Company produced the “snap camera,” a
hand-held camera for general public use. People could now
take candid pictures in public places.63 Warren and Brandeis
anticipated a dangerous mix between this new technology
and the sensationalistic press: “Instantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts
of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.’”64
These new threats required a remedy. The difficulty was
that the existing common law did not currently afford much
of a legal protection of privacy. Defamation law—the torts
of libel and slander—protected against false information, not
true private information. Contract law could protect privacy
within relationships formed between parties, but it could not
protect against privacy invasions by third parties outside of
the contract. Warren and Brandeis observed:
While, for instance, the state of the photographic art was such
that one’s picture could seldom be taken without his
consciously “sitting” for the purpose, the law of contract or of
trust might afford the prudent man sufficient safeguards
against the improper circulation of his portrait; but since the
latest advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to
take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of
trust are inadequate to support the required protection.65

Property law was also inadequate to protect privacy. As
Warren and Brandeis observed: “[W]here the value of the
production is found not in the right to take profits arising
from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief
afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all, it is
63

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW 3-4 (2003).
64
Id.
65
Warren & Brandeis, Right to Privacy, supra, at 211.
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difficult to regard the right as one of property.”66
Warren and Brandeis argued that the common law could
readily develop a remedy for protecting privacy. The authors
noted: “The common law secures to each individual the right
of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”67
These rights were not based upon property. Rather, they
were based upon “the more general right of the individual to
be let alone.”68 From this more general right, protections
against privacy violations could be derived in the common
law.69 Warren and Brandies discussed a number of remedies
to protect privacy, with the principal remedy being “[a]n
action of tort for damages in all cases.”70

IV. THE 20TH CENTURY
A. 1900 TO 1960
1. Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Torts
(a) Early Recognition
It wasn’t until the early 20th century that courts began to
confront the issue of whether to extend the common law to
redress privacy invasions as Warren and Brandeis had
suggested. In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals
confronted the issue in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co.71 An advertisement by Franklin Mills Flour used a
lithograph of Abigail Roberson without her consent.
Roberson sued, alleging that she had been “greatly
humiliated by the scoffs and jeers of persons who have
66

Id. at 200.
Id. at 198.
68
Id. at 205.
69
See id. at 205.
70
Id. at 219.
71
64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
67
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recognized her face and picture on this advertisement, and
her good name has been attacked, causing her great distress
and suffering, both in body and mind.”72 The court,
however, refused to recognize a cause of action because there
was “no precedent for such an action to be found in the
decisions of this court” and the creation of such an action
would more appropriately be achieved by the legislature
because the courts were “without authority to legislate.”73
The Roberson decision sparked a significant debate. A
New York Times editorial criticized the decision, observing
that it “excited as much amazement among lawyers and
jurists as among the promiscuous lay public.”74 A note in the
Yale Law Journal attacked the decision criticized the
Roberson decision for not recognizing a remedy for the
“undoubted injury to the plaintiff.”75 Another law review
article declared that Roberson “shocks and wounds the
ordinary sense of justice of mankind.”76 As a result of this
wave of criticism, one of the judges in Roberson defended
the opinion in the Columbia Law Review.77
In 1903, just one year after the decision, New York
enacted a statute establishing a cause of action for invasion of
privacy.78 The law still remains on the books today.79
A couple of years later, in 1905, the Georgia Supreme
Court recognized a common law tort for privacy invasions in
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company.80 In
facts similar to Roberson, a life insurance advertisement used
72

Id. at 442.
Id. at 447-48.
74
New York Times, Aug. 23, 1902, reprinted in Denis O’Brien, The
Right to Privacy, 2 Colum. L. Rev. 437, 437 (1902).
75
Comment, An Actionable Right to Privacy?, 12 Yale L.J. 34, 36 (1902).
76
36 American L. Rev. 636, quoted in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 50 S.E. 68, 79 (Ga. 1905).
77
Denis O’Brien, The Right to Privacy, 2 Colum. L. Rev. 436 (1902).
78
See, e.g., Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since
Warren and Brandeis, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 703, 704 (1990).
79
See N.Y. Civ. Rts. L. §§ 50-51.
80
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
73

13

the plaintiff’s image without his consent. The court
concluded that a “right of privacy in matters purely private is
. . . derived from natural law.”81 As the court reasoned:
One who desires to live a life of partial seclusion has a right to
choose the times, places, and manner in which and at which he
will submit himself to the public gaze. Subject to the
limitation above referred to, the body of a person cannot be put
on exhibition at any time or at any place without his consent. .
. . It therefore follows from what has been said that a violation
of the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the
individual.82

(b) William Prosser and the Restatement
In 1960, renowned tort scholar William Prosser surveyed
the over 300 privacy cases that were spawned by the Warren
and Brandeis article.83 Prosser concluded that the cases
recognized four distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion;
(2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light or
“publicity”; and (4) appropriation.84 Today, the vast majority
of states recognize most of these torts.85 The most recent
state to do so was Minnesota in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,86 where the state Supreme Court finally recognized the
Warren and Brandies torts in 1998.87
(i) Intrusion Upon Seclusion. As defined by the
Restatement of Torts, intrusion upon seclusion provides:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
81
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reasonable person.88

Intrusion upon seclusion protects against electronic
eavesdropping into conversations in the home,89 as well as
the deceitful entry and clandestine photographing of
activities in the home.90 The tort is not limited to intrusions
into the home. In a case involving well-known consumer
advocate Ralph Nader, the court held that an attempt by
General Motors to hire people to “shadow” him and “keep
him under surveillance” could be tortious if the surveillance
was “overzealous.”91
(ii) Public Disclosure of Private Facts. The tort of public
disclosure of private facts provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
legitimate concern to the public.92

In an early case, Melvin v. Reid,93 the court held that the
use of an ex-prostitute’s maiden name in the movie The Red
Kimono could give rise to a public disclosure action. Courts
have sustained public disclosure suits for publishing a
photograph of a woman whose dress was blown up
involuntarily by air jets;94 for the publication of an article
describing a person’s unusual disease;95 and for posting a
large sign in a window stating that the plaintiff owed a debt.96
The Supreme Court has curtailed the scope of the public
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disclosure tort. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,97 the Court held
that “[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court
documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be
sanctioned for publishing it.”98 In Smith v. Daily Mail,99 the
Court held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the
publication of the names of juvenile offenders: “If a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter
of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a
need to further a state interest of the highest order.”100 And in
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,101 the Court held that a newspaper
could not be liable for publishing the name of a rape victim
obtained from a police report.102
These decisions
notwithstanding, the Court has repeatedly avoided addressing
the constitutionality of the public disclosure tort, and it has
confined its holdings to relatively narrow contexts.
(iii) False Light. The tort of false light is defined as:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard
as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.103

(iv) Appropriation. Pursuant to the Restatement:
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
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invasion of his privacy.104

In the mid-20th century, an offshoot of the appropriation
tort emerged, referred to as the “right of publicity.”105 The
right of publicity originated in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.,106 where the court declared that “in
addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture, and that such a grant may validly be made ‘in gross,’
i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of
anything else.”107 According to Thomas McCarthy, “while
the appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by
an injury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by
an injury to the pocket book.”108
The emergence of the right of publicity is often viewed as
distinct from appropriation, but is sometimes viewed as
merely a dimension of the appropriation tort. William
Prosser did not recognize a distinct tort of publicity, and
neither did the Restatement.109
2. The Emergence of the Breach of Confidentiality Tort
Beyond the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts, another
tort emerged in the common law in the medical context – the
tort of breach of confidentiality. For example, in 1920, in
Simonsen v. Swenson,110 the court recognized that
104
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[t]he relation of physician and patient is necessarily a highly
confidential one. It is often necessary for the patient to give
information about himself which would be most embarrassing
or harmful to him if given general circulation. This
information the physician is bound, not only upon his own
professional honor and the ethics of his high profession, to
keep secret . . . A wrongful breach of such confidence, and a
betrayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action for the
damages naturally flowing from such wrong.111

The Simonsen court concluded that the breach of
confidentiality tort is not absolute, and it does not apply
when disclosure is mandated by statute or when disclosure
will protect the health and safety of others. As one court has
stated: “A majority of the jurisdictions faced with the issue
have recognized a cause of action against a physician for the
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information unless
the disclosure is compelled by law or is in the patient’s
interest or the public interest.”112
Some courts have held that because the breach of
confidentiality tort emerges from the patient-physician
relationship, analogous to a fiduciary one, the tort extends to
a third party who “induces a breach of a trustee’s duty of
loyalty, or participates in such a breach, or knowingly
accepts any benefit from such a breach, becomes directly
liable to the aggrieved party.”113
3. The Growth of Government Record Systems
The rise of the administrative state in the first half of the
20th century resulted in the creation of elaborate systems of
public records.114 For example, the Social Security System,
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created in 1935, required that records be maintained about
each employed individual’s earnings. To administer the
program efficiently, a unique nine-digit number was assigned
to each citizen, known as the Social Security number (SSN).
The number was only to be used for the Social Security
system, and it was not designed as a general identifier, with
social security cards stating that SSNs were “NOT FOR
IDENTIFICATION.”115 As will be discussed later, this
number soon was used for a myriad of other purposes.
4. The Telephone and Wiretapping
(a) The Fourth Amendment: Olmstead v. United States
The early 20th century witnessed the growth of telephone
communication. Shortly after the telephone was patented in
1876, methods of intercepting communications through
wiretapping were developed.116
As with telegraph
communications, there was a growing concern about the
privacy of telephone communications. State legislatures
responded with new legislation. For example, in 1905,
California expanded its 1862 law against intercepting
telegraph messages to telephone calls.117
In 1928, the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United
States118 confronted the issue of whether the Fourth
Amendment required a warrant before the government could
engage in wiretapping. The Court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to wiretapping because it did not
involve trespass inside a person’s home: “There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured
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by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was
no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”119
Justice Louis Brandeis dissented. Although he did not
cite to his article, The Right to Privacy, his dissent reflects
many of its central ideas. Brandies argued that new
technological developments necessitated revising traditional
views of the Fourth Amendment in order to preserve its
purpose of protecting privacy:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the government. Discovery and invention
have made it possible for the government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet.120

(b) Federal Communications Act § 605
Despite the Court’s opinion in Olmstead, wiretapping
continued to be viewed with considerable distaste. Justice
Holmes called it a “dirty business.”121 One year after
Olmstead, J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, stated that
“while it may not be illegal . . . [wiretapping] is unethical and
it is not permitted under the regulations by the Attorney
General.”122 Hoover declared that any FBI employee
engaging in wiretapping would be fired.123 Ironically,
Hoover went on to become one of the greatest abusers of
wiretapping.
Six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted § 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.124 Section 605
provided: “no person not being authorized by the sender shall
119
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intercept any communication and divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communications to any person.”125 The
statute only applied to federal, not state, officials. According
to the Supreme Court, § 605 prohibited evidence obtained by
wiretapping from being used in court.126 But the statute did
not restrict officials from engaging in wiretapping, only from
disclosing
intercepted
communications
in
court
127
proceedings.
As a result, wiretapping by the FBI and state
law enforcement officials increased dramatically throughout
the 20th century.128
5. The FBI and Increasing Domestic Surveillance
The FBI was originally formed in 1908 amid substantial
opposition in Congress to a federal police force.129 Indeed,
Congress never directly authorized the creation of the FBI by
legislation. At first, the FBI was known as the Bureau of
Investigation (BI); it became the FBI in 1935.130 Throughout
the 20th century, the FBI expanded in size and in the scope
of its surveillance activities.
During World War II, the FBI received a profoundly
expanded authority to engage in wiretapping and investigate
national security threats. The FBI seized upon fears of
Communism during the 1950s to increase its ability to
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engage in electronic surveillance.131 Hoover greatly abused
his powers as head of the FBI. He wiretapped his critics and
people whose views he disliked, and he maintained an
elaborate system of files about the personal lives of hundreds
of prominent individuals, politicians, professors, and others.
Hoover despised Martin Luther King, Jr., and he engaged in
a systematic surveillance of him, including wiretapping and
bugging his conversations.132 When the FBI learned of
King’s extramarital affairs, a high level official sent King a
letter suggesting that King commit suicide or else the
recordings of his conversations would be “bared to the
nation.”133
Hoover’s abuses came to light a few years after his death,
when in 1975, Congress’s Church Committee conducted an
extensive inquiry into Hoover’s activities.134
6. Freedom of Association and the McCarthy Era
The Civil Rights era led to attempts by some Southern
states to expose the names of those involved in the civil
rights movement, subjecting people to community sanctions.
In NAACP v. Alabama,135 the Court held that the NAACP
could not be compelled to disclose the names and addresses
of its members. According to the Court, there is a “vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in
one’s associations.”136 This was because revelation of
membership in the NAACP exposed members “to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and
other manifestations of public hostility.”137
131
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The First Amendment right to freedom of association, as
well as the Fifth Amendment, did not afford similar
protections to the extensive investigation of Communists in
the 1950s.138 The hunt for Communists was led by Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, and aided with substantial help from
Hoover.139 The House Un-American Activities Committee
(HUAC)140 forced individuals to testify publicly about their
Communist Party ties and to disclose names of others
involved with the Party. The public disclosure of people’s
ties to the Communist Party often resulted in ostracism and
blacklisting.141 Many journalists, professors and entertainers
were fired and blacklisted from future employment.142
In Barenblatt v. United States,143 a person refused to
answer the HUAC’s questions and was jailed for contempt.
The Court held that the First Amendment was not violated by
the questioning. In Wilkinson v. United States,144 a witness
who criticized the HUAC was interrogated about Communist
ties. The Court upheld the questioning because there was a
“reasonable ground to suppose that the petitioner was an
active Communist Party member.”145
Justice Black
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dissented, arguing that “this case involves nothing more nor
less than an attempt by the Un-American Activities
Committee to use the contempt power of the House of
Representatives as a weapon against those who dare to
criticize it.”146
Ultimately, McCarthy experienced a downfall, the HUAC
was disbanded, and many today view the Communist
hysteria as a profound overreaction.
B. THE 1960S AND 1970S
1. New Limits on Government Surveillance
(a) Fourth Amendment Resurgence: Katz v. United States
The Fourth Amendment underwent a revolution in the
1960s. In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,147 the Court held that in all
criminal proceedings, evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is excluded from evidence in criminal
trials.148 And in 1967, the Court in Katz v. United States149
overruled Olmstead. Katz involved the wiretapping of a
telephone conversation made by the defendant while in a
phone booth. The Court declared: “What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.”150 From Katz, the
Court’s current approach to determining the Fourth
Amendment’s applicability emerged – the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. The test, articulated in Justice
Harlan’s concurrence, asks whether (1) a person exhibits an
146
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“actual or subjective expectation of privacy” and (2) “the
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”151
(b) Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control Act of
1968
One year after Katz, in 1968, Congress vastly expanded
its statutory protections against electronic surveillance
beyond the limited protection of §605. Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act152 extended the
reach of wiretap regulations to state officials as well as to
private parties.153 Despite its profound increase in the extent
of protection, Title III had important limitations. It applied to
the interception of “aural” communications; it did not apply
to visual surveillance or other forms of electronic
communication.
2. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
(a) Decisional Privacy: Griswold v. Connecticut
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Court held in a series of cases
that the Constitution protected a “zone of privacy” that
safeguarded individual autonomy in making certain decisions
involving their bodies and families. In 1965, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,154 the Court held that the government could not
ban contraceptives. Although the Constitution does not
explicitly protect a right to privacy, the Court reasoned that
there such a right is found in the “penumbras” of many of the
ten amendments of the Bill of Rights.155
Following
151
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Griswold, the Court held in Roe v. Wade156 that the right to
privacy “encompass[es] a woman’s decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.”157
(b) Information Privacy: Whalen v. Roe
Four years after Roe v. Wade, in 1977, the Court held in
Whalen v. Roe158 that the constitutionally protected “zone of
privacy” extends to two distinct types of interests: (1)
“independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions”; and (2) the “individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.”159 The former interest
describes Griswold and Roe; the latter interest was one that
the Court had not yet defined. This latter interest has been
called the “constitutional right to information privacy.” The
Court also articulated this interest in Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services,160 decided that same year.
Following Whalen and Nixon, the Court did not develop
the right of information privacy. Nevertheless, a majority of
circuit courts have recognized this right, which has been
involved in a substantial number of cases.161
3. Responses to the Rise of the Computer
(a) Burgeoning Interest in Privacy
The development of the computer in 1946 revolutionized
information collection. Throughout the second half of the
20th century, the computer revolutionized the way records
and data were collected, disseminated, and used. The
156
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increasing use of computers in the 1960s raised a
considerable public concern about privacy.162 Commentators
devoted significant attention to the issue.163 Privacy also
became an important topic on Congress’s agenda.164
(b) Freedom of Information Act of 1966
The growing number of government agencies and the
expanding regulatory scope of the administrative state led to
a strong sentiment that government records should be open to
the public. In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), dramatically reforming public
access to government records. Under FOIA, “any person”
may request “records” maintained by an executive agency.165
People or entities requesting records need not state a reason
for requesting records.166 Today, all fifty states have
freedom of information laws, many of which are based upon
the FOIA.
Among nine exceptions to disclosure, the federal FOIA
contains two exceptions that safeguard privacy. Exception 6
exempts “personnel and medical files and similar files the
162
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disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.”167 Exemption (7)(C) exempts
“records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes . . . which could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”168
When possible, records with redacted private data are
disclosed to requesters.169
(c) Fair Information Practices
The increasing computerization of information and the
burgeoning repositories of personal data in federal agencies
continued to be a topic of importance. In 1973, the United
States Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW)
issued a report, Records, Computers, and the Rights of
Citizens, which analyzed these problems in depth. The report
observed:
[A]n individual must increasingly give information about
himself to large and relatively faceless institutions, for
handling and use by strangers—unknown, unseen, and, all too
frequently, unresponsive. Sometimes the individual does not
even know that an organization maintains a record about him.
Often he may not see it, much less contest its accuracy, control
its dissemination, or challenge its use by others.170

The report recommended the passage of a code of Fair
Information Practices:
There must be no personal data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.
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There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without his consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure
the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take
reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.171

As Marc Rotenberg observes, the Fair Information Practices
“played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the
United States,”172 and influenced privacy law around the
world.
(d) Privacy Act of 1974
A year after the HEW report, Congress passed the
Privacy Act of 1974.173 The Act responded to many of the
concerns raised by HEW. It regulates the collection and use
of records by federal agencies, and affords individuals right to
access and correct their personal information.174 Although the
Act made important strides in bringing government
information systems under control, the Act has a number of
shortcomings. The Privacy Act does not apply to the private
sector. Nor does it apply to state or local agencies.
Another limitation in the Privacy Act is the “routine use”
exception where information may be disclosed for any
“routine use” if disclosure is “compatible” with the purpose
for which the agency collected the information.175 Numerous
commentators have criticized the “routine use” exception as
171

Id. at 41-42.
See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture
of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1, 44.
173
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (2000) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
174
5 U.S.C. § 552a(d).
175
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
172

29

an enormous loophole.176
The Privacy Act also attempted to restrict the use of SSNs.
The HEW report had noted that there was “an increasing
tendency” for the SSN to be used as a “standard universal
identifier.”177 The Privacy Act aimed to “curtail the
expanding use of social security numbers by federal and local
agencies and, by so doing, to eliminate the threat to
individual privacy and confidentiality of information posed
by common numerical identifiers.”178
Unfortunately, the Act did not restrict the use of SSNs by
the private sector. As a result, the use of SSNs continued its
upward trend.179 Today, SSNs are used as a form of
password to access one’s accounts and records at banks,
investment firms, schools, and hospitals.180
(e) Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA),181 otherwise known as the “Buckley Amendment,”
regulates the accessibility of student records. FERPA does
not apply to records maintained by school law enforcement
176
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officials182 or health and psychological records.183
(f) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of
1978,184 created a distinct regime for electronic surveillance
to gather foreign intelligence. Whereas Title III regulated
electronic surveillance for domestic law enforcement
purposes, FISA applied when foreign intelligence gathering
was “the purpose” of the investigation.185 FISA permits
electronic surveillance and covert searches pursuant to court
orders, which are reviewed ex parte by a special court of
seven federal judges. Information obtained through FISA
orders can be used in criminal trials.186 The protections
against surveillance are much looser than those of Title III.
Under Title III and the Fourth Amendment, surveillance is
only authorized if there is a showing of probable cause that
the surveillance will uncover evidence of criminal activity.
Under FISA, orders are granted if there is probable cause to
believe that the monitored party is a “foreign power” or “an
agent of a foreign power.”187
4. Financial Privacy
Several important legal developments regarding financial
privacy occurred throughout the 1970s. Many of these
developments involved the lessening of financial privacy.
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(a) Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
In earlier times, in small towns, people could readily
learn about each others’ financial condition and
trustworthiness. Creditors had first-hand information about
other people or could learn about them through community
gossip. In the 20th century, with the bulging population and
increasing mobility of people, creditors no longer had these
easy methods to obtain data about people.188
Creditors
began to rely on records and documents to assess
reputation.189 These developments spawned credit reporting
agencies, companies that obtain and report information about
a person’s credit history. Credit reports contain a detailed
financial history, financial account information, outstanding
debts, bankruptcy filings, judgments, liens, and mortgage
foreclosures.
Today, the three major credit reporting
agencies (Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union) have
compiled extensive data about virtually every adult citizen.
Due to a series of complaints about erroneous credit
reports and non-responsiveness by credit reporting agencies,190
Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in
1970.191
The FCRA provides limited protections for
individuals. It enables people to access their records, and
restricts the manner in which records are disclosed.
Individuals can challenge inaccuracies on their reports192 and
can sue to collect damages for violations of the Act.193
However, FCRA immunizes creditors and credit
reporting agencies from lawsuits for “defamation, invasion of
privacy, or negligence” except when the information is
188

STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND
REPUTATION IN AMERICA 3, 73 (1993).
189
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 314 (2000).
190
See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEBSITE, supra, at 23.
191
15 U.S.C. § 1681.
192
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
193
15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
32

“furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such
consumer.”194 Although the FCRA allows people to sue for
negligent violations of the Act,195 there is a two-year statute
of limitations “from the date on which the liability arises.”196
In TRW, Inc. v. Andrews,197 the Supreme Court held this
period begins to run when the violations occurred, not when
the individual discovers them. Many inaccuracies in credit
reports, however, are not discovered for a significant period
of time.
(b) Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
The Bank Secrecy Act,198 enacted in 1970, requires banks
to retain records and create reports to help law enforcement
investigations. The Act was passed due to concerns that the
computerization of records would make white collar crime
more difficult to detect.199 Federally insured banks must
record the identities of account holders and maintain copies
of each financial instrument. International transactions
exceeding $5000 are subject to reporting,200 as well as
domestic transactions exceeding $10,000.201
In California Bankers Association v. Shultz,202 the
Supreme Court upheld the Act against a Fourth Amendment
challenge by a group of bankers and account holders. The
Court concluded that the bankers lacked Fourth Amendment
rights in the data because “corporations can claim no equality
with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”203
The account holders failed to allege that they engaged in
194
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transactions exceeding $10,000, and as a result, lacked
standing.204
(c) United States v. Miller
In 1976, in United States v. Miller,205 the Court held that
financial records possessed by third parties are not subject to
Fourth Amendment protection.206 Federal agents issued
subpoenas to banks for the financial records of the defendant.
The defendant argued that the government needed a warrant
in order to obtain the information. The Court concluded that
the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the records because “the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”207 As the
Court reasoned:
The checks are not confidential communications but
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.
All of the documents obtained, including financial statements
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course of business.208

(d) Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
In 1978, two years after Miller, Congress passed the
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA),209 which provided
limited protection of financial records to fill the gap left by
Miller. Pursuant to the RFPA, government officials must use
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a warrant or subpoena to obtain financial information.210
There must be “reason to believe that the records sought are
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”211 Subject
to certain exceptions, the customer must receive prior notice
of the subpoena.212
5. The Retreat from Boyd
The 1886 case, Boyd v. United States, established that the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments prevented the government
from issuing a subpoena to obtain a person’s private
papers.213 Later on, in Gouled v. United States,214 the Court
concluded that the police could not search one’s “house or
office or papers” to obtain evidence to use against that person
in a criminal proceeding.215 These two cases established
what became known as the “mere evidence rule,” which
barred the seizure of papers unless they were
instrumentalities of a crime or illegal contraband. Although
the mere evidence rule was chipped away in subsequent
decisions, it was officially eliminated in 1967 in Warden v.
Hayden.216
In Couch v. United States,217 the Court
concluded that personal records maintained by third parties
were not protected by the Fifth Amendment. The Court
noted that “the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal
privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to
information that may incriminate him.”218
Since the
210
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subpoena was issued on a third party, “[i]nquisitorial
pressure or coercion against a potentially accused person,
compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning
words or produce incriminating documents is absent.”219
Similarly, in Fisher v. United States,220 the Court concluded
that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply to
subpoenas for documents maintained by a person’s
attorney.221 The Fifth Amendment, concluded the court, was
limited to protecting against only the “compulsion to testify
against oneself.”222
6. The Narrowing of the Fourth Amendment
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court issued several
decisions constraining the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection In 1979, the Court concluded in Smith v.
Maryland223 that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a
list of the telephone numbers a person dials that were
recorded by a pen register.224 Since people “know that they
must convey numerical information to the phone company”
and that the phone company records this information for
billing purposes, people cannot “harbor any general
expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”225
Just three years earlier, the Court in Miller had employed a
similar rationale with regard to bank records.226
In 1978, the Court held in Zurcher v. The Stanford
Daily,227 that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit state
authorities from searching the premises of third parties if the
authorities had probable cause to believe that evidence of a
219
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crime would be located at the property.228 Zurcher involved
a search of the offices of a newspaper that had taken
photographs of a violent demonstration. The newspaper had
no involvement in the demonstration and nobody at the
newspaper was suspected of criminal activity.
The
newspaper argued that searches of their offices “will
seriously threaten the ability of the press to gather, analyze,
and disseminate news.”229 The Court, however, concluded
that the requirements of a warrant “should afford sufficient
protection” against these harms.230
C. THE 1980S
1. Receding Fourth Amendment Protection
Throughout the 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a series
of decisions adopting a narrow view of what constitutes a
reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, in Florida
v. Riley,231 the Court concluded that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a greenhouse when the police flew
over it with a helicopter.232 In California v. Greenwood,233
the Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in garbage left in bags on the curb because “[i]t is
common knowledge that plastic bags left on or at the side of
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”234
The Court also reasoned that the trash was left at the curb
“for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the
trash collector, who might himself have sorted through [the]
trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.”235
228
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In the schools and the workplace, the Court concluded
that people only have limited expectations of privacy and that
searches by school officials and government employers are
not subject to regular Fourth Amendment requirements. In
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,236 the Court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement “is unsuited to the
school’s environment” and that probable cause “is not an
irreducible requirement of a valid search.”237 Likewise, at
the workplace, the Court held in O’Connor v. Ortega,238 that
searches by government employers do not require a warrant
or probable cause; they only need to be “reasonable . . . under
all circumstances.”239
2. The Growth of Federal Privacy Statutory Protection
(a) Privacy Protection Act of 1980
Dissatisfaction over Zurcher led Congress to pass the
Privacy Protection Act in 1980.240 The Act restricts the
search or seizure of “any work product materials possessed
by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to
disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or
other similar form of public communication.”241 As a result
of the Act, a subpoena is needed to obtain work product
materials, which permits the party to challenge the request in
court and to produce the documents without having law
enforcement officials intrude on the premises.
(b) Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of
236
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1984242 protects the privacy of cable records. Cable
companies must notify subscribers about the collection and
use of personal information.243 Companies cannot disclose a
subscriber’s viewing habits.244 The Act is enforced with a
private right of action.
(c) Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of
1988
As discussed earlier, a major loophole in the Privacy Act
of 1974 has been the “routine use” exception.245 Under this
exception, to detect fraud, the federal government in 1977
began running computer comparisons of employee records
with the records of people receiving benefits.246 In 1988,
Congress addressed this practice, known as “computer
matching” by passing the Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act.247 The law established procedures for
computer matchings, but did not halt the practice.248
(d) Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988
In 1988, Congress passed the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act (EPPA).249 The EPPA prohibits private sector
employers from using polygraph examinations on employees
242

42 U.S.C. § 551.
See 42 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1).
244
See 42 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(C)(ii).
245
See supra Part IV.B.3(d).
246
See REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY, supra, at 86; Robert Gellman,
Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 198-99 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
247
See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a (a)(8)-(13), (e)(12), (o)-(r), (u)).
248
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER MATCHING: QUALITY
OF DECISIONS AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES LITTLE AFFECTED BY 1988
ACT 3 (1993); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA
PRIVACY LAW 101 (1996).
249
Pub. L. 100-618, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2001-2009.
243

39

and prospective employees. The Act does not apply to public
sector employers.250
Employers can, however, use
polygraphs “in connection with an ongoing investigation
involving economic loss or injury to the employer’s business,
such as theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, or an act of
unlawful industrial espionage or sabotage” when “the
employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee was
involved in the incident or activity under investigation.”251
Private sector employers who provide security services are
exempt.252
(e) Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988
The confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice
nominee Robert Bork sparked a law to protect video cassette
rental data. Reporters attempted to obtain a list of the videos
Bork had rented from his video store. Incensed at this
practice, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act
(VPPA) of 1988.253 The VPPA forbids video tape service
providers from disclosing customer video rental or purchase
information.254

3. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
In 1986, Congress revisited its wiretapping law by
substantially reworking Title III of 1968. The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)255 expanded Title III
to new forms of communications, with a particular focus on
250
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computers.
The ECPA restricts the interception of
transmitted communications256 and the searching of stored
communications.257 Title I of the ECPA, known as the
“Wiretap
Act,”
regulates
the
interception
of
258
communications.
Title II, referred to as the “Stored
Communications Act,” governs access to stored
communications and records held by communications service
providers (such as ISPs).259 Title III, called the “Pen Register
Act,” provides limited regulation of pen registers and trap
and trace devices.260
4. OECD Guidelines and International Privacy
Internationally, there was substantial growth in
information privacy law. The most significant development
was the creation of guidelines for the protection of
information privacy by the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1980.261 The
OECD Privacy Guidelines built upon the Fair Information
Practices articulated by HEW in 1973.
The OECD
Guidelines contain eight principles: (1) collection limitation
– data should be collected lawfully with the individual’s
consent; (2) data quality – data should be relevant to a
particular purpose and be accurate; (3) purpose specification
–the purpose for data collection should be stated at the time
of the data collection and the use of the data should be
limited to this purpose; (4) use limitation – data should not be
disclosed for different purposes without the consent of the
256
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individual; (5) security safeguards – data should be protected
by reasonable safeguards; (6) openness principle –
individuals should be informed about the practices and
polices of those handling their personal information; (7)
individual participation – people should be able to learn
about the data that an entity possesses about them and to
rectify errors or problems in that data; (8) accountability –
the entities that control personal information should be held
accountable for carrying out these principles.
D. THE 1990S
1. The Internet, Computer Databases, and Privacy
The last decade of the 20th century presented profound
new challenges for the protection of information privacy,
such as rise of the Internet and the increasing use of email in
the mid-1990s. The Internet presented new methods of
gathering information. When a person visits a website, the
website can record information about the person and how the
person navigates the website. This information is referred to
as “clickstream data.” To identify users, companies use an
identifying tag known as a “cookie,” a text file that is stored
on the user’s computer. When the user returns to the
website, the site searches for its cookie, which identifies the
user and allows the website to access the data it collected
about the user from her previous web surfing activity.
Another information collection device, known as a “web
bug,” secretly uses pixel tags to gather data about the user.262
Throughout the 1990s, the collection and use of personal
information in computer databases rapidly accelerated. The
decade saw the rise of an entire industry devoted to
aggregating personal information for use by marketers – the
262
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database industry. Hundred companies gather personal data
and create massive databases which they then rent to
marketers. The industry generates billions of dollars each
year.263
2. The Continued Growth of Federal Statutory Protection
As in the 1980s, Congress continued to pass a number
of major statutes to address emerging privacy problems.
(a) Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
In 1991, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA),264 which permits people to request
that telemarketers not call them again. If the telemarketer
continues to call, people can sue for damages of up to five
hundred dollars for each call.265
(b) Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994
For many years, states had been selling their motor
vehicle records to marketers.266 The sale of this information
generated millions of dollars to states, and individuals had no
way to block the dissemination of their personal data.267 In
1994, Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA),268 which requires that states first obtain a person’s
consent before disclosing her motor vehicle record
information to marketers.269 The law was challenged on
263
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federalism grounds, but in Reno v. Condon,270 the Supreme
Court held that DPPA fell within Congress’s authority to
regulate interstate commerce:
The motor vehicle information which the States have
historically sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct
marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to
contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information
is also used in the stream of interstate commerce by various
public and private entities for matters related to interstate
motoring.271

This decision has important implications for many federal
privacy statutes. Even in the face of the Court’s trend to
limit Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, the
Court recognized that the dissemination of personal
information is an issue of interstate commerce.
(c) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996 is the first federal statute to directly
address health privacy.272 HIPPA required the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to draft regulations to
protect the privacy of medical records.273 HHS’s regulations,
among other things, require that people authorize all uses and
disclosures of their health information that are not for
treatment, payment, or health care operation (such as for
marketing purposes).274
HIPAA does have some important limitations. First, not
all medical records are covered – only records maintained by
certain types of record-holders: health plans, health care
270
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clearinghouses, and health care providers.275 Although
physicians, hospitals, pharmacists, and health insurers are
covered, other parties that have medical information are
not.276
For example, many websites gather health
information when conducting medical assessments, but these
websites are not covered by HIPAA.277
Second, the regulations contain a broad provision for law
enforcement access. They permit law enforcement officials
to obtain medical records with only a subpoena rather than a
warrant.278 Additionally, law enforcement officials can
obtain health data if they request it “for the purpose of
identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness,
or missing person.”279
(d) Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
of 1998,280 governs the collection of children’s personal
information on the Internet.281 The law only applies to
children under the age of 13.282 Children’s websites must
post privacy policies and obtain “parental consent for the
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from
children.”283 COPPA applies only to websites “directed to
children” or where the operator of the website “has actual
knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a
275
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child.”284
(e) The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
(GLB) Act,285 which allows financial institutions with
different branches or affiliates engaging in different services
to share the “nonpublic personal information” among each
branch of the company. Affiliates must inform customers of
the information sharing, but people have no right to stop the
companies from sharing it. However, when financial
institutions desire to share customer data with third parties,
people have a right to opt-out.286
The GLB Act resulted in a mass mailing of privacy
policies to customers, informing them that data might be
shared with other companies and giving people a number to
call or a form to fill out if they wanted to block this data
sharing. The opt-out provisions of the Act were strongly
criticized. For example, as Ted Janger and Paul Schwartz
noted, very few customers have opted-out.287 The reasons,
they stated, are that privacy policies are hard to understand
and are sometimes misleading; and opt-out rights are difficult
and cumbersome to exercise.288
3. The FTC and Privacy Policies
Since 1998, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
been bringing actions against companies that violate their
own privacy policies. The FTC has interpreted the FTC Act,
284

15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A).
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68016809).
286
15 U.S.C. § 6802(a), (b).
287
Ted Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 Minn. L. Rev.
1219, 1230 (2002).
288
See id. at 1230-41.
285

46

which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce,”289 to be infringed when a company
breaks a promise it made in its privacy policy. The FTC can
bring civil actions and seek injunctive remedies. Since it
began enforcing the Act in this manner, the FTC has brought
several high-profile cases, almost all of which have resulted
in settlements.290
4. The EU Data Protection Directive
In 1996, the European Union promulgated the Data
Protection Directive which establishes basic principles for
privacy legislation for European Union member countries. As
Joel Reidenberg explains:
The background and underlying philosophy of the European
Union Directive differs in important ways from that of the
United States. . . . [T]he United States has, in recent years, left
the protection of privacy to markets rather than law. In
contrast, Europe treats privacy as a political imperative
anchored in fundamental human rights.291

The EU Data Protection Directive provides for a
comprehensive protection of personal information
maintained by a broad range of entities. This omnibus
approach exists in stark contrast to the United States’
approach, which regulates privacy “sectorally” in various
narrow contexts.292
The EU Data Protection Directive also contains
restrictions on the flow of personal data outside the borders
of EU nations to other countries not governed by the
289
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Directive. Data can be transferred to a third country if the
country “ensures an adequate level of protection.”293 As
Peter Swire and Robert Litan observed, the vastly different
approaches of the United States and EU presented significant
problems, since the United States may not be found to have
an “adequate level of protection” and this would have severe
commercial implications.294 In 1998, the U.S. Department of
Commerce began negotiating with the EU so that the United
States would satisfy the Directive’s requirement of having
adequate protection.
In 2000, an agreement was reached,
known as the Safe Harbor Arrangement.
Under the
Arrangement, U.S. companies can voluntarily agree to follow
principles (drawn from the Fair Information Practices).
Compliance with the principles will be enforced by the FTC
and Department of Transportation.295

V. THE 21ST CENTURY
A. AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: PRIVACY IN A WORLD OF
TERROR
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the nation awakened to the reality that there were
dangerous terrorist cells within U.S. borders. Shortly after
September 11, there was a strong political drive for new
surveillance measures and new powers for law enforcement
officials.
B. THE USA-PATRIOT ACT
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In a very short time after September 11, Congress passed
the “Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing
Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act” (USA-PATRIOT Act) of 2001. The Act
made several significant changes to the ECPA and FISA,
among other statutes. In one significant amendment, the
USA-PATRIOT Act enlarged the definition of pen registers
and trap and trace devices to apply to addressing information
on e-mails and to “IP addresses.”296 The Act also provided
for new justifications for delayed notice of search warrants,
increasing the types of subscriber records that could be
obtained from ISPs and communications providers, and
allowing for a nationwide scope for pen register orders and
search warrants for email.297 Additionally, the Act expanded
the application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA). Previously, the looser protections of FISA applied
only when “the purpose” of the investigation was to gather
foreign intelligence. The USA-PATRIOT Act expanded
FISA’s application to instances when foreign intelligence
gathering was “a significant purpose” of the investigation.298
The Act also provided for roving wiretaps under FISA as
well as increased sharing of foreign intelligence information
between law enforcement entities.299
C. NEW SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES
Recently, a series of new surveillance technologies and
techniques have been grabbing headlines. In 2000, the Wall
Street Journal reported that the FBI had developed a device
known as “Carnivore” to intercept people’s email and instant
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messaging information from their ISPs. Carnivore is
installed directly to the ISP’s server and it can search through
email of particular individuals. In 2001, a case called United
States v. Scarfo,300 revealed the existence of a device that can
be secretly installed into one’s computer to log all of a
person’s the keystrokes. And news reports revealed that the
FBI had developed a computer virus called “Magic Lantern”
that could be deployed into a person’s computer to record her
keystrokes.
In 2001, police in Tampa, Florida, began using a
surveillance system known as “face recognition” that would
match people’s faces on surveillance cameras to mug shots in
a databases.
In late 2002, a project by the Department of Defense
known as “Total Information Awareness” (TIA) came to
light. TIA involves the creation of a central government
database of personal information.301 The database is to be
composed of data gathered from the private sector, including
information about finances, education, travel, and health.
As with all new threats to privacy, these measures
engendered significant criticism. Recently, the U.S. Senate
voted to halt TIA. And in a 2001 Supreme Court case, Kyllo
v. United States,302 the Court held that the use of a thermal
imaging device to detect heat patters emanating from a
person’s home fell within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Previously, cases involving various sensory
enhancement devices had concluded that these devices
merely extend what can be detected through the unaided
senses.303 In contrast, in Kyllo, the Court noted: “It would be
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology. . . . The question
300
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we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”304
However, challenges to privacy remain. Although TIA
has been halted, many similar information gathering projects
by the government are underway. New surveillance and data
collection technologies continue to be developed and
deployed. The law of information privacy never has time to
rest.

V. CONCLUSION
Information privacy law has come a long way. Spurred
by the development of new technologies, the law has
responded in numerous ways to grapple with emerging
privacy problems. Although the law has made great strides,
much work remains to be done. Several scholars, including
myself, have criticized the ability of information privacy
laws thus far to grapple with the growing collection and use
of personal information in computer databases.305 As Paul
Schwartz observes, “personal information in the private
sector is often unaccompanied by the presence of basic legal
protections. Yet, private enterprises now control more
powerful resources of information technology than ever
before.”306
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